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Previous benefit:cost analysis (BCA) of the Malawian Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP, formerly 
known as the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme, AISP) has not allowed for wider consumer and 
growth benefits , and this has made it difficult to compare the programme’s returns against estimates 
of returns to other possible investments, such as in roads or agricultural research, when these other 
estimates may include allowance for consumer and growth benefits.  This paper presents results 
achieved with a method that allows for a wider range of benefits from the programme but 
nevertheless has relatively simple analytical and data demands.  
2. Benefit - cost analysis purposes and principles  
Benefit - cost analysis (BCA) of input subsidy programmes has two main functions: 
• To give an indication of the returns to the programme as compared to returns that might be 
achieved from alternative investments, to guide overall government investment and spending 
decisions across, for example, agricultural input subsidies, research, and infrastructure.  
• To provide information about the variables that are important in determining costs and 
benefits of a specific programme or type of programme, and hence guide programme design 
and implementation decisions.  
These two uses of BCA present analysts with something of a dilemma as the first requires the use of 
common standards and methods for BCA across different programmes while the second requires 
accurate estimates of the relative importance of different variables in affecting returns in particular 
investments. This will often require tailoring methods to match specific programme features, and the 
results may not be comparable across analysis of different investments.  
In this context, we suggest seven principles for the choice and implementation of BCA methods to 
provide rigorous, reliable, and objective estimates of benefits and costs. BCA methods applied in any 
situation should be 
1. Practicable: applicable with available or obtainable data and analytical resources (skills and 
software for example);  
2. Externally consistent: providing measures that are comparable with generally accepted good 
practice in definitions of costs and benefits; 
3. Contextualised: taking account of particularities that affect the benefits and costs of a specific 
programme; 
4. Holistic: taking account of all the significant benefits and costs associated with a policy or 
investment programme (both directly to recipients and indirectly to others); 
5. Internally consistent: taking account of ‘counterfactuals’, comparing actual behaviours and 
outcomes with investments against those that would have occurred without them;  
6. Transparent: stating and discussing assumptions, measures, data sources, shortcomings and 
possible bias and inaccuracies in methods and results; 
7. Cost effective: chosen, developed and implemented to ensure that costs of analysis are 
commensurate with or proportional to the value of the information provided.  
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Cost effectiveness of methods is of course affected by the costs of BCA methods in providing 
information and in the value of the information provided.  
• Costs are determined by resource demands for gathering extra information needed and 
for analysis  
• The value of the information provided is determined by its quality and by the scope for its 
use.  
o Quality is determined by external and internal consistency, holism and 
contextualization  and by strengths and weaknesses of analytical methods  
o Scope for use of information is determined by transparency of results,  by the 
strengths and weaknesses of different methods, and by the potential ‘decision space’  
for changes in policy choices, design and implementation in the light of information 
provided by BCA.   
There are particular challenges in applying the first four of the principles above to the specific 
situation in which the FISP operates.   
1. Practicable. There are severe limitations in data availability (for example on crop areas and 
yields, yield and production effects of subsidised seed and fertiliser, and the number of  farm 
families in the country) and limited financial and human resources available for analysis. 
However, determination of the “counterfactual” situation is complex, involving changes in the 
whole economy in farm incomes, in food prices, and in the real incomes of consumers.  
2. Externally consistent. Limited availability of good quality data poses problems for the 
application of good practice and a further difficulty arises with the long standing history of 
policy interventions inhibiting maize imports and exports, as this makes it very difficult to 
identify true economic prices for maize and what national prices would have been without the 
subsidy. 
3. Contextualised.  The effects of the subsidy on livelihoods are complex, widespread and in 
many ways specific to the problems faced by poor Malawian smallholders. Analysis has to take 
account of these contextual issues  requiring more complex, non-standard analysis – but this 
conflicts with the two previous principles.  
4. Holistic: The scale and nature of the FISP means that it has widespread, complex and varied 
effects on the livelihoods of different farm households, on consumers, and on maize and 
labour markets. Ideally this requires holistic consideration of dynamic and interacting changes 
in rural livelihoods and in rural and national markets, but this presents severe data and 
analytical challenges.  
3. Benefit - cost analysis methods  
Investment and policy analysis methods can be classified by the extent to which they focus on direct, 
‘partial equilibrium’ effects of an investment or policy on specific beneficiaries as against wider, 
indirect ‘general equilibrium’ effects on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries across all sectors in an 
economy. Consideration of wider indirect effect increases the analytical complexity and data 
requirements, but these effects may dominate the direct effects for large scale investments affecting 
food prices and the productivity of large areas of land and large amounts of labour – as is the case 
with the FISP.  
It is helpful to distinguish between three basic methodological approaches to BCA for large scale policy 
investments:  
a) Regression models estimate returns to investments by analysing comparative data sets across  
different regions in a country, for example, implicitly taking account of multipliers and wider 
general equilibrium market  effects. 
b) Computable general equilibrium (CGE) and multi-market models analyse the effects of 
investments by simulating economic behaviour with and without investments  
c) Partial equilibrium models examine investment’s welfare impacts on producers and 
consumers. 
These models differ as regards data demands, analytical challenges, and ability to allow for market 
failures, differential effects on different types of consumers and producers, linkages and multipliers 
across markets, and the interactions between these. Table 1 sets out the broad characteristics of these 
three types of model. 
Table 1 Broad characteristics of three model types  
 
Regression models CGE/ Multimarket models 
Partial equilibrium 
models 
Data demands Time series data for 
different relatively 
independent regions 
National & multi-sectoral 
data on factor ownership, 
productivity & market. 
Productivity impacts of 
investment 
Demand (& ideally supply) 
information on specific 
commodity/ies.  
Productivity impacts of 
investment 
Capacity to describe 
multi-market, indirect 
effects 
Good: intrinsic in  analysis 
of broader welfare effects 
Good: key benefit of these 
models: depends on quality 
of model formulation & data 
Weak: no explicit 
consideration, but ad hoc 
adjustments can allow for  
these effects 
Capacity to describe 
differential market 
failure effects 
Good: intrinsic in analysis 
of broader welfare 
effects, may not capture 
spillovers 
Weak: very challenging as 
regards data demands & 
model formulation 
Weak: no explicit 
consideration, ad hoc 
adjustments can allow for  
these effects 
Capacity to isolate 
effects of specified 
intervention(s)  
Difficult if covariant 
changes or with varying 
spillovers across regions 
Good, depending on quality 
of model 
Can be good, depending 
on context & processes 




Simpler data & analytical  
demands 
Weaknesses Demanding requirements 
for historical data sets; 
assumptions / context 
may not be explicit or 
generalisable; may not 
account for some 
spillover effects 
Complex & demanding, esp.  
representation of market 
failures & differential 
behaviour of producers & 
consumers - otherwise  
misleading ; assumptions / 
context may not be explicit. 
Does not take account  of 
market effects – these 
can only be addressed 
with simple relatively ad 
hoc adjustments 
 
It is clear from table 1 that the three approaches have different, and in many ways complementary 
features and strengths and weaknesses. We can conclude from this that  
• different choices of method will be needed in different contexts  
• In all cases analysts must recognise, take account of and document the limitations of their 
methods and data 
• Use of BCA results to compare returns from different investments must take great care to 
allow for differences in analytical methods, issues and data quality  
• Use of BCA results to guide investment design and implementation must allow for strengths 
and weaknesses in analytical methods, issues and data quality.   
• In the particular situation of the Malawi FISP  
o empirical situations and data available do not allow the use of regression analysis  
o CGE and multi-market models are too expensive and complex and lack reliable data for 
regular and detailed year by year analysis 
o the more limited data and analytically demanding partial equilibrium models are the most 
practicable (though they still present significant challenges)  
o Major concerns among decision makers within Malawi have been more with evolving, 
relatively detailed design and implementation questions and less with relative returns to 
different investments, but this may change. The issue of external consistency has to date 
been less important, but it is important in wider regional debates about the relative 
returns to input subsidies as compared with other possible investments.  
4. Problems and challenges with Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) of the FISP  
Evaluations of the 2006/7 and 2008/9 subsidy programmes, and estimates of benefit costs ratios for 
other years, used a standard partial equilibrium methodology for estimating the economic benefit cost 
ratio and fiscal efficiency of the subsidy programme.  It was recognised, however, that this method did 
not take account of wider benefits to poor consumers, from lower food prices and that paradoxically a 
lower price of maize provided a lower estimate of programme benefit when in fact lower maize prices 
should lead to wider growth and poverty reduction benefits. This raises concerns with use of these 
results in comparing estimated returns from subsidies and other investment.  
The concerns may be broadly classified into related problems first with data, second with 
methodology, and third with underlying theoretical questions. These theoretical questions  concern 
the measure and distribution of benefits to different stakeholders (maize producers, consumers, 
recipients), the scope and spread of benefits and processes of change (affecting maize prices, wage 
rates, land and labour productivity, the non farm economy), and the valuation of incremental 
production (using market and import prices). 
5. Improving FISP benefit/ cost estimates 
Consideration of these theoretical, methodological and data difficulties together with the earlier 
discussion of purposes and principles for BCA suggests four approaches to improving the BCA of the 
subsidy programme 
1. Continued use of partial equilibrium analysis but with a formal method of price estimation  
2. Extension of the method to distinguish between producer and consumer gains and between 
subsidy recipients and non-recipients 
3. Introduction of dynamic effects of growth multipliers   
4. Consideration of results with alternative estimates of time periods of return 
All of these approaches involve elaboration of the estimation of programme benefits: estimation of 
programme costs is not conceptually problematic. Total costs incurred in input acquisition (including 
transport and distribution costs) are added to programme administration costs, with application of 
shadow exchange rates to non-tradable costs. Costs of acquisition for subsidised inputs that displace 
unsubsidized inputs are subtracted from the programme costs, as these are simply a transfer from 
government to the recipients of those subsidised inputs and have little effect on the benefit: cost ratio 
of the programme (they do, however, affect the Net Present Value (NPV) of the programme, and 
hence its fiscal efficiency). 
5.1. Formal estimation of prices and of consumer and producer gains 
Historical data on average annual maize prices and estimated national maize availability (from 
production, imports, and exports)  were used to estimate regression models with different elasticities 
of demand ranging from 0.22 to 0.51. These allowed estimation of maize supply with the subsidy and, 
from incremental production estimates derived from yield responses and incremental subsidised input 
use, supply and prices without the subsidy. The model with demand elasticity of 0.51 provided the 
most robust results and was also the best regression fit. Import parity prices (from SAFEX with 
allowance for transport costs) provided an upper limit to the economic valuation of incremental maize 
production. Gains to producers (subsidy recipients and non recipients) and consumers were then 
estimated on the basis of changes in real income through changes in sales and purchases prices and 
volumes.  The use of prices estimated from this formal approach raises estimated average returns to 
the programme over 2005/6 to 2010/11 from an earlier estimate of 1.21 (using analysts price 
judgements) to 1.47 (see table 2). This is due to the more formal method commonly estimating a 
higher without subsidy price, itself partly due to these estimates giving more weight to the possibility 
of substantially lower price imports from Mozambique.  
Separation of relative gains to producers and consumers shows that the balance of gains to consumers 
relative to producers is lower (a) with more elastic demand and (b) in years where lower domestic 
production and higher domestic prices relative to import prices lead to more imports, as under these 
conditions they gain less from price reductions associated with increased production. Subsidy 
recipients gain more under these conditions as higher prices for incremental production increase their 
benefits from increased production while all surplus producers suffer less from price falls.  
 
Table 2 Alternative estimates of returns to FISP investments, 2005/6 to 2009/10 





ED NB BCR FE BCR 
 
Basic estimate 
0.51 59.28 1.47 0.69 1.59 
 Original 29.19 1.21 0.30 1.26 
 
Simple multiplier 
0.51 104.47 1.61 1.14 1.77 
 Original 56.23 1.33 0.51 1.41 
 
Differentiated (a) 
0.51 78.37 1.56 1.00 1.71 
 Original 38.76 1.32 0.41 1.39 
 
Differentiated (b)  
0.51 114.74 1.68 1.31 1.86 
 Original 63.16 1.40 0.58 1.50 
 
Averages are simple (unweighted) averages. Annualised return if Benefit Cost Ratio is achieved 
over 10 months.  Fiscal Efficiency = net benefit / fiscal cost.  
5.2. Effects of multipliers   
There is no standard methodology for building of growth and liquidity multipliers into partial 
equilibrium analysis, but the estimated economic benefits and costs from partial equilibrium analysis 
can simply be multiplied by relevant estimates of agricultural multipliers.  A number of studies 
estimate agricultural multipliers of around 1.4 in Sub Saharan Africa and Malawi. Multipliers are 
therefore introduced initially by multiplying farm benefits and costs by 1.4 and, non-farm costs are 
multiplied by 1.2 to allow for possible but lower multiplier effects of alternative use of resources 
invested in the programme This approach is then refined using different multipliers for different types 
of people, distinguishing between consumers (who are dominated by poor rural people), producers 
(where less poor rural people dominate in production for sale) and subsidy recipients. For the latter, 
results are compared with two different multiplier values, the first with a lower value reflecting a bias 
in subsidy distribution to the less poor, the second with a higher value to investigate possible effects 
of more effective targeting of subsidised inputs to poorer households. Lower multipliers for less poor 
people and higher multipliers for poorer people reflect a general pattern observed in growth 
multipliers, and may also result from dynamic benefits from subsidy receipt and lower prices and 
higher real incomes relaxing seasonal finance constraints.   
Two broad observations can be made from the results from this analysis. First, the results in table 1 
show that estimates of net benefits, benefit cost ratios and fiscal efficiencies increase when the effects 
of multipliers are allowed for, and these increases can be substantial. Second, and not shown in the 
table, comparison of results from different years shows that since poorer households generally have 
higher multipliers and account for a higher share of consumption than they do of production, subsidies 
that lead to domestic price falls will, other things being equal,  generally lead to higher returns. 
Similarly, greater targeting of the poor as subsidy recipients will also generally raise returns.  
5.3. Effects of alternative estimates of time periods of return  
Previous BCA of the FISP has used benefit cost ratios in a way that implies an annual return on 
investment. However it might be argued that returns are achieved over a shorter period, less than 12 
months from fertiliser purchase and application to harvest. If this is the case then the annualised 
return on investment will be higher than the simple benefit cost ratio, as shown in Table 2.  
6. Conclusions 
Application of the principles and purposes for BCA to the development of a more holistic partial 
equilibrium BCA methodology for the programme has led to  
• Higher estimates of returns from investment to the programme  
• Results that are more comparable with the estimates to returns from alternative investments 
This suggests that with good implementation the programme can provide returns that are comparable 
with or exceed those achievable from alternative and complementary investments in infrastructure, 
education and agricultural research. The programme therefore has an important role as a critical 
element in a strategy of balanced government investments promoting poverty reducing growth in 
Malawi. High international maize prices, with currently smaller increases in fertiliser prices, should 
maintain good returns, although there are, of course, also risks of poor implementation and of 
unfavourable weather and changes in prices that depress returns.  
The methodology also reinforces and adds to lessons from previous BCA for FISP design and 
implementation: returns will be improved by measures that increase yield responses to fertiliser and 
that reduce displacement. The inclusion of multipliers in the BCA strengthens the importance of all of 
these issues, as gains from improved efficiency and effectiveness are multiplied. It also adds further 
weight to the importance of targeting, of ensuring that maize marketing policies allow increased maize 
production to lower maize prices (as benefits to poorer subsidy recipients and consumers tend to have 
higher multipliers) and suggests that to maximize linkages and reduce leakages  there should be 
complementary investments in measures facilitating the growth of the non-farm economy and of non-
staple agriculture (for example horticulture, legumes and livestock) in response to subsidy-led growth 
real in real incomes.  
The improved methodology does, however, highlight the need for good data on the yield and 
production effects of subsidised inputs. This is a major challenge. Malawi has excellent data on market 
prices, and biennial AISP/ FISP evaluation surveys have provided valuable information on targeting and 
use of subsidised inputs. However continuing difficulties are faced with data on the total number of 
farm households, on cropping areas and yields, and on yield responses to inputs and agronomic 
management. Improved data on these variables is critical not just for the evaluation of the FISP, but 
for much wider policy development, monitoring and evaluation.   
